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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
SURETYSHIP
In Daigle v. Oakwood Homes, Inc.' the court held that the statutory
bond required of mobile home dealers by the Motor Vehicle Act 2 and
conditioned upon the dealer complying with any written contracts for
the sale or exchange of motor vehicles and complying with the laws
relating to the sale of motor vehicles "was only intended to protect the
purchaser from the unscrupulous motor vehicle dealer." Accordingly,
the court found that the surety bond did not guarantee the purchaser
against redhibitory vices in the vehicle since "there were no misrepre-
sentations relating to the identity of the vehicle or any other unscrupulous
dealing" on the part of the dealer, the plaintiff's principal complaint
being that the mobile home was defective and the sale subject to redhibition.
In Koeniger v. Lentz,3 the court rejected the efforts of a surety
who, upon paying a note he had guaranteed, obtained a conventional
subrogation to it, and then tried to collect the note entirely from another
surety. The court relied upon Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land
Dev. Co.4 which in effect held that where parties contract as principal
obligors toward a creditor, their liability will nonetheless be regulated
according to the rules of suretyship if some of them are in fact lending
their credit to the others. The precise question at issue in Aiavolasiti
had also been rejected long ago in the case of Phillips v. Pedarre5
In McKesson Chemical Co. v. Tideland Chemical Co., 6 the defend-
ant's president wrote a letter to the plaintiff on company stationary
beginning with the words: "This is a personal guarantee ... for Tideland
Chemical Incorporated." It was signed by the president over his typed
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 460 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
2. La. R.S. 32:701-34 (1963 & Supp. 1985) The bonding provisions are found in
La. R.S. 32:718 (D) (Supp. 1984) (repealed in 1984 La. Acts No. 733, § 4).
3. 462 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
4. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
5. 156 La. 509, 100 So. 699 (1924).
6. 471 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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name under which also appeared the word "President". The plaintiff's
action against the president as a surety for the company was met with
the plea that he had signed only in his representative capacity and that
the letter was in any event not sufficiently express to constitute a
suretyship. The court responded to the latter argument with the well
established principle that a contract of "guarantee" is synonymous with
suretyship. It also found no ambiguity in the letter, despite the fact
that it identified the defendant as president of the company, noting that
the words "personal guarantee" in the body of the letter were not
consistent with corporate liability, and more importantly, that to construe
the contract as the defendant contended would mean that the corporation
was "personally guaranteeing" its own obligations, rendering the agree-
ment of no effect at all, contrary to established canons of construction.
PLEDGE
In Fontenot v. Hanover Insurance Co.,7 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the pledgee of an incorporeal was not an indispensable
party to an action by the pledgor to enforce the pledged credit. The
court relied upon two earlier cases, American Capital Corporation v.
Falk8 and Hewitt v. Williams,9 which held that the pledgor of an
obligation was entitled to enforce it if the pledgee did not do so.
American Capital relied upon the official comments to Code of Civil
Procedure article 696 (that declares the pledgee is the proper person to
enforce the pledge), which observe that if the pledgee fails or neglects
to do so, the pledgor may bring the action.
The court appears to be in error both in its decision and its reliance
upon the authorities mentioned. The cases and comments referred to,
as well as other authorities cited by them, recognize that while the
pledgee is vested with possession of the thing and is the person entitled
to enforce the obligation, it remains the property of the pledgor and
he may take steps to enforce or protect it. However, each of the cases
cited involved negotiable instruments, and the courts clearly held that
for the plaintiff to succeed he would have to procure and present the
notes sued upon and establish that he was acting with the permission
of the pledgee in attempting to collect the amount. Unless the pledgee
is made a party to the action, he is obviously not bound by the judgment.
What is to prevent him from enforcing the pledged right again? If the
debtor has been notified of the transfer of the right by his creditor, he
is prohibited from paying the creditor. To say the pledgor, who is still
7. 465 So. 2d 678 (La. 1985).
8. 181 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 1032, 183 So.
2d 653 (1966).
9. 47 La. Ann. 742, 17 So. 269 (1894).
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the owner of the pledged property, has sufficient interest to bring a
suit to protect or enforce the pledged rights does not necessarily mean
that he should not be required to make the pledgee a party to the
action, or to show that the pledgee has in fact authorized him to bring
the action. Such is the actual import or holdings of the cases relied
upon by the court.
MORTGAGES
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held in Magee Finance
Service of Slidell, Inc. v. White'0 that a mortgagee who obtained a
judgment against his debtor on obligations secured by mortgages waiving
the homestead exemption, but who did not have the mortgages recognized
in the judgment, lost its mortgages and with them the waiver of the
homestead exemption. Since the debtor's homestead exemption primed
the judicial mortgage arising from the recordation of the judgment, the
debtor's homestead would be exempt to the extent allowed by statute.
The customary practice in Louisiana, in proceeding by ordinary
process upon an obligation secured by a mortgage, has long been to
allege the existence of the mortgage, ask that it be recognized and
declared executory, prove its existence at the time of trial or default,
and have the judgment recognize the existence of the mortgage, the
property it affects, and its essential terms. The jurisprudence is not
entirely consistent as to the effect upon the mortgagee's rights when
this is not done. There is authority for the proposition that it is not
necessary, to explicitly ask that a mortgage or privilege be recognized in
a suit upon the principal obligation, and that the validity and rank of
the mortgage may be asserted by way of summary process to determine
the order of distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's
property under a writ of fieri facias issued in execution of the judgment."
Other cases indicate that if the plaintiff prays for recognition of a
mortgage or privilege and the judgment as rendered fails to mention it,
the omission is equivalent to a rejection of the plaintiff's demand and
extinguishes the mortgage or privilege.' 2 The cases holding it unnecessary
to obtain a recognition of the mortgage for the most part involve disputes
among mortgagees as to the relative rank of their claims. The courts
were undoubtedly impressed by the fact that declaring the mortgage
secured the plaintiff's claim would have been of no consequence to the
other mortgagees who are not parties to the action.
10. 471 So. 2d 982 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985).
I1. Perot's Estate v. Perot, 122 La. 640, 643, 148 So. 903, 904 (1933).
12. See, Houma Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Allied Towing Services, Inc., 468 So. 2d
637 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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The decision in the Magee case is not illogical. Failure to obtain
recognition of the mortgage and waiver of the homestead exemption
means the matter would have to be litigated again. On the other hand,
until the creditor actually seizes the property, the question of whether
it is or is not the homestead of the debtor arguably is not at issue. In
addition, the creditor should be able to defeat the claim when it is
raised by showing that it has been waived with respect to the particular
property as to the particular debt. Whether the decision is correct or
not, it illustrates the importance to the creditor of carefully preserving
and securing recognition of his rights at all stages of the process of
collection. He is certainly not entitled to nor should he expect much
sympathy or liberality of construction by the courts in his efforts to
execute upon his debtor's property.
THE PRIVATE WORKs ACT
In Ragusa v. Burns,3 the court held that the Private Works Act14
as it existed before its revision in 1981' 5, denied a privilege to a general
contractor who did not file his contract before beginning the work.
6
The court also held that a purchaser who bought the property being
improved after the work had begun took it subject to the privileges
given by the Act, but was not personally liable to the claimants, even
in cases where the seller who contracted for the work had failed to
comply with the Act and was personally responsible for the claims arising
thereunder. 7
Lake Forest, Inc. v. Cirlot Co.' presented a somewhat difficult
question as to the proper classification of a contract for purposes of
the Act. The defendants were unpaid contractors of the Lionel J. Favret
Construction Company. Favret had been excavating sand from the plain-
tiff's land under a contract with the latter. The defendants filed notices
of privilege under the Private Works Act. The plaintiff sought to have
the privileges declared invalid of, in the alternative, restricted to the
interest of Favret in the property.' 9
13. 462 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 464 So. 2d 1375 (La.
1985).
14. La. R.S. 9:4801-55 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
15. The Act was completely revised and restated by Act 724 of 1981. References to
the Act in this work refer to the provisions as revised, unless the contrary is stated.
16. The rule is perpetuated in the revision of 1981, with the qualification that such
filing is unnecessary if the amount of the contract is less than $25,000.
17. This also should be the result under the revised act. La. R.S. 9:4806 (B) (Supp.
1986) provides that the claims under the Act are limited to "the owner or owners who
have contracted with the contractor. ... See infra note 22.
18. 466 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
19. Section 4806(B) of the Act limits the privilege given to the interest in the immovable
of the person who contracts for the work. Thus, if a lessee contracts with a contractor
the privileges are limited to the lease.
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Favret's contract, which was unrecorded, gave it the exclusive right
to operate a sand pit on the property for twenty months. It also required
Favret to conform the pit to certain boundaries with specified slopes
and to fill it with water within thirty days after completion of the work.
Favret was also to pay the plaintiff a royalty on the sand extracted
from the pit.
The plaintiff first asserted that the privileges were invalid because
the construction of the pit and extraction of the sand was not an
"improvement" to the land and was therefore not subject to the Act.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the Act gives a privilege
to those who perform a "work" upon an immovable and that a work
is defined as "single continuous project for the improvement, construc-
tion, erection, reconstruction, modification repair, demolition, or other
physical change of an immovable or its component parts."
20
The policy of the Act is obvious. If the owner undertakes some
modification or change to an immovable, it should be of no concern
to the persons with whom he deals whether the work "improves" or
deteriorates the thing. It is enough that the owner desires the work done
and undertakes to do it.
The plaintiff next argued that since the contract called for the
extraction of sand from the earth it was governed by the Mineral Code
and that the Act did not apply. The court rejected this claim, noting
that the Act, in defining a "work," excludes from its provisions only
"the drilling of a well . .. or other activities in connection with such
a well or wells for which a privilege is granted by R.S. 9:4861." The
section cited is the first section of what is commonly referred to as the
"oil, gas and water well lien act." That act is limited to activities in
connection with oil, gas, and water wells and has no application to
sand, gravel, or so-called "hard minerals."
The third contention of the plaintiff gave the court more difficulty.
The plaintiff argued that its contract with Favret, calling for the ex-
traction of the sand and payment of a royalty, was a mineral lease and
therefore the defendants' privileges were to be limited to Favret's interest
in the lease (which presumably at the time of the suit was extinguished
because of its breach).
The court rejected the argument, somewhat inconsistently, by first
holding that the contract was not a lease but more closely resembled a
construction contract, thus making the plaintiff an owner who had
contracted with a general contractor, and thereby imposing the privilege
upon the immovable itself. The court found that the plaintiff's objective
in entering into the Favret contract was to construct a lake on the land
as a part of a plan to develop the land for residential purposes and
20. La. R.S. 9:4808 (A) (1983).
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that the contract actually required Favret to accomplish that objective.
Secondly, the court held that the privilege existed because the "lease"
was not recorded, and as a result the defendants had no way of knowing
that they were dealing with a lessee. Thirdly, it held that the privilege
existed because the work was obviously being done "for the benefit"
of the owner.
The court's judgment, based upon its determination of the facts, is
undoubtedly correct. However, some of the grounds upon which the
decision in Lake Forest is based appear to be questionable, if not clearly
incorrect. The Private Works Act makes it clear that neither the lessor
nor his interest in the land is liable under the Act for work performed
on the land by the lessee, absent some contractual assumption by him
of the obligations of the lessee.' Furthermore, the Act requires anyone
claiming a privilege upon property, as a consequence of doing work
upon it for someone other than the owner, to prove that the owner
was contractually bound for the work, either to the claimant or by way
of a contract between the owner and an intermediary.22 Since the defend-
ants could only prove that they enjoyed a privilege upon the property
by relying upon the Favret contract, they could hardly claim its lack
of inscription rendered it void as to them, or claim it should be given
an effect it actually did not have. In the absence of a contract between
Favret and the plaintiff, the defendants would enjoy no privilege at all.
How could the defendants point to it as the touchstone of their rights
and at the same time deny it as what it is?
The court was, however, intrinsically correct when it realized that
not every contract calling for the extraction of a substance from the
earth, be it a mineral or not, is a mineral right or lease within the
purview of the Mineral Code. A close analysis of the Mineral Code
21. This is confirmed by Act 903 of 1985, amending La. R.S. 9:4806(B) (1983) of
the law to require a written agreement by the lessor to impose liability on the lessor
before responsibility would attach. See infra note 22.
22. The claims against an owner ... are limited to the owner or owners who
have contracted with the contractor or to the owner or owners who have agreed
in writing to the price and work of the contract of a lessee, wherein such owner
or owners have specifically agreed to be liable for any claims. ...
La. R.S. 9:4806 (B) (Supp. 1986) (as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 903).
The court's objection that the defendants had no way of knowing the "contractor" was a
lessee misses the point. If the contract, or a notice of it is recorded as required by the Act, third
persons will, of course, know the status and situation of the contractor. The Act, although pro-
tecting persons who perform work upon land at the request of the owner, does not authorize a
subcontractor to simply assume that anyone who walks into their door and hires them to do work
upon a tract of land has any particular right to do so. Would the subcontractors in this case be
entitled to hold the owner for the price of their work and assert their lien if Favret had
been a trespasser? Would they not instead be liable to the owner for digging up his land
without his consent?
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discloses that it regulates only those arrangements entered into for the
commercial extraction of minerals or other substances from the earth.
It is true that this is not as obvious from its provisions as one might
like. In the case at issue for example, if the contract was a mineral
lease its term would have expired unless the production from the lease
was in paying quantities. 23 The Lake Forest court found that the purpose
of the contract was to obtain the construction of a lake by the contractor;
that as an incident to the work, sand, having value, would be removed;
that the contractor would dispose of it, and would receive a part of
its value as additional compensation for the work. A contract for the
construction of a road or building, requiring the contractor to remove
dirt, sand, gravel, or other substances excavated for the foundations of
the work, is not converted into a lease because the contractor is given
the proceeds from the sale of the earth as additional compensation for
his work, or because the proceeds are partly applied as a credit against
the contract price. Neither is an ordinary predial lease converted to a
mineral lease because it authorizes the lessee to level 4he soil, build a
pond on the land, dig a well, or excavate the earth for the foundations
of the work he is authorized to construct.24 Neither would the fact that
the lessee is directed or authorized to dispose of the material excavated
at his own expense, risk or profit, rather than to spread it about on
the land, convert an ordinary predial lease to a mineral lease.25
23. La. R.S. 31:124 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as La. Min. Code]. Among other
articles of the Mineral Code that implicitly recognize the commercial nature of mineral
rights are: Article 29, which provides that the owner of a mineral servitude is not exercising
his rights "in good faith" if he attempts to mine or extract minerals when there is no
"reasonable expectation" that they can be produced in "paying quantities"; Article 122,
which provides that the lessee of a mineral lease is bound "to operate the property as
a prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor;" and La. Min. Code
art. 15 which, in defining the power of a landowner to create mineral rights, notes that
he may "convey, reserve, or lease his right to explore and develop the land for production
of minerals ......
24. "A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore
for and produce minerals .. " La. Min. Code art. 114. "A mineral lessor is bound to
deliver the premises ... [and] to refrain from disturbing the lessee's possession ......
La. Min. Code art. 119; "A mineral lessor impliedly warrants title to the interest leased ......
La. Min. Code art. 120. These and the other provisions of the Mineral Code would
hardly seem applicable to the kind of arrangement contemplated by the Favret contract
as determined by the court.
25. The proper classification of agreements that contain elements common to several
nominative contracts is hardly unique in Louisiana's legal system. It could hardly be
contended that a contract for the demolition of a building-would have to be in writing,
or that if it was recorded it would be enforceble against subsequent owners of the land
on the grounds that it was the sale of the building and thus of a distinct immovable.
Would the result be different if the contract provided that the contractor agreed to remove
the debris from the demolition, but was entitled to any salvage value it might have? Is
there any difference between the sale of timber as a distinct immovable and a sale of
particular trees to a purchaser, who is required to cut and haul them off?
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OIL, GAS AND WATER WELL LIEN ACT
In C-Craft Marine Services, Inc. v. Log Exploration Company,2 6
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the failure of
a privilege claimant to timely file a notice of his privilege in the mortgage
records as provided by section 4862 of the Oil Well Lien Act 27 results
in the loss of the privilege. The courts have been divided on the question
of whether timely filing of the notice of privilege is required to preserve
the privilege, or only its ranking vis-a-vis other such liens. Two federal
cases held that the priority alone is affected and that the privilege itself
persists after the time for filing expires.28 A later case by the Louisiana
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit indicated that the privilege was
lost, although the matter was only inferentially at issue. 29 The problem
is caused by the first two sections of the Act in question which, in
essence, provide:
Any person who performs any labor or service ... in con-
nection with the drilling of any well . . . , has a privilege on
* . . the ... well ... and for the cost of preparing and recording
the privilege. . ... 0
If a notice of such . . . privilege . . . is filed for record and
inscribed in the mortgage records ... within one hundred and
eighty days after the last day of the performance of the labor
or service ... the privileges are superior to all other privileges
or mortgages against the property ... [except for certain vendors
privileges or mortgages] .... 3
Since there is nothing in the first section to limit the existence of
the privilege, or require recordation as prerequisite of its effectiveness,
and the second section implies only that failure to file the required
notice affects the "superiority" of the privilege, the federal courts con-
26. 470, So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 921 (La. 1985).
27. La. R.S. 9:4861-67 (1983 & Supp. 1985). Although the Act technically creates a
privilege in favor of certain persons supplying labor, material, or services in connection
with the drilling and operation of wells, it is entitled a "privilege" act, and it is customary
to, refer to the privilege as a "privilege" and the Act as the Oil Well Lien Act. That
practice is followed here.
28. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal and the United States District Court
for the Western District have held the privilege is not rendered invalid, only that the
privilege claimant loses his priority. See, Continental Cas. Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply
Co., 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971); Beacon Gasoline Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 455 F. Supp.
506 (W.D. La. 1978).
29. Western Wireline Serv., Inc. v. Pecos Western Corp., 377 So. 2d 892 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1979).
30. La. R.S. 9:4861 (Supp. 1985).
31. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1985).
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cluded, as did the dissenting judge in C-Craft Marine that the privilege
continued indefinitely without recordation or filing. The conclusion is
plausible, in light of the portions of the Act quoted above. Other
portions, however, apparently contemplate that filing is necessary to the
continued existence of the privilege itself: "Unless interrupted by suit thereon,
the privilege shall prescribe and become ineffective one year form the date of
recordation. "32
A. If a statement of claim or privilege . . . is filed, any
interested party may deposit with the recorder of mortgage ...
a bond of a lawful surety company ... to guarantee payment
of the obligation secured by the privilege ....
B. If the recorder of mortgages finds . . . the terms and
amount of a bond deposited with him to be in conformity with
this Section he shall ... cancel the statement of claim or priv-
ilege . . . from his records . . ..
Unless the privilege is recorded, there is no time fixed by the Act
for its extinction. Of course it is possible that the Legislature intended
such a result (this would make the privilege coterminous with the life
of the claim it secures, not an unusual result under Louisiana law). If
this were the Legislature's intention, it is difficult to understand why
section 4865 specifies a one year prescriptive period for the privilege
from the date of its filing, leaving the prescription of the unfiled privilege
unprovided for.34 Section 4867, relative to the bonding out of the priv-
ileges, contemplates filing as necessary to the existence of the privilege
in that it refers to the "creditor who has secured his claim" by recording
the privilege, and furthermore, bonding out the claim would have the
anomalous effect of maintaining the privilege without recordation, al-
though it had been canceled by the clerk if the contrary interpretation
is taken. The most reasonable construction appears to be that adopted
by the court in the case at hand.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND THE VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE ON MOVABLES
In Warren Refrigerator Company v. Fosti Midstream Fueling and
Service, Inc.," the court struck down two chattel mortgages because
one failed to set forth the terms of the note it secured and the other
32. La. R.S. 9:4865 (1983).
33. La. R.S. 9:4835 (A) (Supp. 1985).
34. It also appears reasonably certain that neither section 4865 nor section 4867 is
concerned with the effect of the inscription of the privilege as distinguished from its
existence.
35. 462 So. 2d 1343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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failed to set forth the time of its payment.3 6 The court recognized that
where the mortgages had been given in the sale of the mortgaged
property, the seller enjoyed a vendor's privilege upon the thing sold.
Civil Code article 3327 provides that the vendor's privilege is divested
if the purchaser does not continue in possession of the property. In the
case at hand, the purchaser was declared a bankrupt. This transfers title
to his property to the trustee. The trustee subsequently abandoned title
and it passed back to the bankrupt, presumably because there was no
equity in it for the bankrupt's estate. The bankrupt argued that the
transfer of title to the trustee was sufficient under article 3227 to
extinguish the purchasers privilege and that the subsequent transfer back
of the title did not reinstate it. This was rejected by the court, which
apparently viewed the so-called passage of title to the trustee as being
provisional and in itself insufficient to divest the purchaser of his priv-
ilege. This seems reasonable in light of the well known holdings of the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that the vendor's privilege
is enforceable against the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act. 37 It was
also argued that the privilege had been lost because the property was
physically in the possession of third persons. The court, rejecting these
contentions, reasoned that the possession referred to was not the mere
physical detention of the thing, but the right to possession, and unless
36. These conclusions are undoubtedly correct in light of La. R.S. 9:5352 (1983),
although one would hope that the legislature in its wisdom will someday eliminate the
incredible complexity required to perfect a chattel mortgage. Every other state in the
union, including some which probably have as many transactions in a month as are
confected in Louisiana in a year, gets along very well under the U.C.C. with a simple
signed document creating the equivalent of a chattel mortgage. As Louisiana's law now
stands, one can validly mortgage a $100,000,000 shopping center if he can prevail upon
the clerk to file a paper in any form signed by the owners of the property that evidences
their intention to mortgage it, reasonably identifies the property, and declares the amount
of the obligation it secures. However, to obtain a chattel mortgage on a $500 cash register
in the same shopping center, it is necessary to have an authentic act of mortgage, or
one duly authenticated, with the necessary notary and witnesses, which describes the item
with particularity, including all thirteen digits of its serial number, if such be the case,
and which describes with particularity the amount, terms of payment, and other details
of the note it secures, and then to record it in the chattel mortgage records of as many
as two different parishes. The complicated, prolix, and unduly formal requirements of
the chattel mortgage act in no way enhances the integrity of the mortgage or protects
the innocent. The requirements for the most part have served primarily as a means of
increasing the compensation of bankruptcy trustees who have to some extent been dependent
for their fees upon avoiding security placed upon the debtor's property prior to his final
plunge into insolvency.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 3227 states: "He who has sold to another any movable
property has a preference on the price . . . if the property remains in the possession of
the purchaser."
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some person other than the buyer acquired some right to possess the
thing, the mere fact that it was being detained by someone other than
the owner did not affect the privilege.18
38. In our view, the vendor's preference established by La. C.C. Art. 3227 is
viable so long as the right to possession of the movable property remains in
the vendee, although it be shown that others without color of right have taken
physical possession of the movable effects.
462 So. 2d at 1348.

